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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MARVIN L. WOODWARD, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
MILDRED L. WOODWARD, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
CASE NO. 
18089 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE 
Appeal from a portion of the Decree of Divorce 
awarding respondent non-vested retirement benefits of 
the appellant. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The parties were divorced on October 9, 1981. 
Among other things, the Court, Honorable 
VeNoy Christofferson presiding, awarded to the 
respondent one-fourth of all proceeds which the 
appellant will receive upon his retirement from Civil 
Service, including the non-vested contribution of the 
Government. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant respectfully requests this Court 
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to set aside the award to respondent of that portion 
of appellant's retirement benefits which are not 
vested and which may be accrued in the future. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties' divorce trial was heard on 
October 9, 1981 with the Honorable VeNoy Christofferson, 
District Judge, presiding. The Court entered its 
decision awarding the divorce to appellant as well as 
the custody of four minor children. The appellant was 
awarded the real estate and home which the Court 
determined to have an equity of $40,000.00 after 
deducting the costs of sale. (R-70) 
The appellant was also awarded two vehicles and 
the respondent one. The difference in their equity was 
in respondent's favor in the sum of $2,000.00. The 
Court granted appellant one-half of this sum and 
deducted it from the real estate equity, leaving a 
net equity in the real estate of $39,000.00. (R-71) 
Of this amount, the respondent received an equity lien 
against the real estate of $19,500.00, payable to her 
upon sale of the home, the appellant's remarriage or 
when the youngest qhild reached majority, whichever 
occurred first. (T-52) 
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The only other asset of the parties was appellant's 
Civil Service retirement. Appellant had worked for Civil 
Service for fifteen years, approximately the same length 
of time as his marriage to respondent. (T-52) The Court 
reasoned that since he would have to work another fifteen 
years to obtain full retirement benefits, the respondent 
would be entitled to one-fourth of his ultimate benefits, 
in other words, one-half of the amount accumulated by 
appellant during his marriage. (R-72) The Court included, 
however, the share to be contributed by the Government 
upon appellant's retirement, a sum which has not yet 
vested in the appellant. (T-75) Also included by this 
award would be the increase that appellant would earn in 
future years by reason of promotions and other increased 
pay benefits. 
ARGUMENT 
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING RESPONDENT RETIREMENT 
BENEFITS OF APPELLANT NOT YET EARNED OR VESTED. 
In answers to interrogatories, appellant attached 
a copy of his retirement plan for Civil Service. (R 28-31) 
From his plan it can be seen that: 
1. Given appellant's age, he cannot generally 
retire until thirty years minimum service. (See I) 
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2. His retirement annuity amount depends on 
the highest salary obtainable by averaging his salary 
for the highest five years of service. (See III(l)) 
3. Appellant contributes to the Fund at the 
rate of 6-1/2% of his basic salary. The Government 
also contributes to the Fund. (See preamble to Plan) 
4. If appellant terminates his employment 
prior to retirement eligilibility, only his contributions 
are refunded to him. (See IX) 
At trial, appellant testified that he had 
approximately $17,500.00 in his retirement account, 
all of which represented his own contributions. (T-34) 
At the conclusion of the trial, the Court awarded 
the divorce to appellant and gave him custody of the 
four minor children. The appellant was also awarded the 
home subject to an equity lien in the respondent for 
$19,500.00 which represents one-half of the equity of 
all the assets of the marriage, excluding the retirement 
fund. (R-71) 
When awarding respondent one-fourth of appellant's 
retirement pay, the following discussion occurred: 
THE COURT: As to the retirement, as I read this 
chart on the options, he's been working fifteen years 
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and has been married substantially for that period of 
time, and under these is where you can discontinue 
service after twenty-five, but you earn your full equity 
after thirty years minimum service apparently, at any 
age, no matter how old you are after you've had thirty 
years. So he can work his thirty years. At this point, 
I would assume he has vested interest in at least half 
of that or fifteen of it. So that the equity he has in 
his retirement up to this point is one-half, his equity. 
One-half of that one-half would be one-fourth, and this 
one-fourth then, I'd grant an equity to the defendant 
for one-fourth of the retirement as it is received. Do 
you understand what I mean by that. 
MR. FLORENCE: I understand what you mean by the 
bottom, by the conclusion. Are you taking the amount 
that he has contributed to his retirement at the present 
time and giving her one-fourth of that payable as it 
is received by him? 
THE COURT: No. I don't know what he will receive. 
I don't know what options he'll take. His option may be 
to take money, get out quicker. His option may be to go 
more time and get more. But whatever it is that he takes, 
at this time I'm saying that her equity is one-fourth of 
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that. Suppose at such time as he does elect to retire 
and take his retirement pay and say at that time -- I 
don't know, say it's $1,200.00 a month. He would pay 
her $300.00 of it. That one-fourth of it. 
MR. FLORENCE: If he works to the age of fifty 
five and elects then to retire at that time, you are 
awarding her a fourth of his retirement? 
THE COURT: His pay, uh-huh. Personal property 
MR. FLORENCE: Your honor, so I'm not -- so 
there's no misunderstanding on that, you are not then 
awarding her a specific dollar amount in the retirement, 
you are giving her a one-fourth interest in it, whatever 
it may be? 
THE COURT: Whatever it may be as he receives 
and it's paid to him. 
MR. FLORENCE: And that is in the form of a cash 
settlement despite her condition at that time or her 
position in life or her status? 
THE COURT: Well, yeah. This isn't based on an 
actual award of property. 
MR. FLORENCE: I appreciate that, but basically 
what it appears to me is happening is that you are 
awarding her a fourth interest in funds that he will 
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receive and accumulate and work for in the next twenty 
years. 
THE COURT: No, that's why I took half of it off. 
She's not getting anything for the next half of what 
he earns. 
MR. HADFIELD: He's saying a fourth of thirty 
years is a half of fifteen years. 
THE COURT: See, I'm just giving her the ones 
that he's accrued up to now. He gets three quarters of 
it and she gets one quarter. What I'm saying is that half 
of it he's going to earn after they're divorced. So he's 
entitled to all of that. But I'm saying that she has 
acquired an interest simply as a property interest in 
what he's acquired so far, which is one-half of what it 
will be, and her equity in that one-half is --
MR. FLORENCE: As I understand it, the Government 
contributes to this only upon his retirement. That's 
only going to come in one paycheck, so if -- in other 
words, when the amounts that appear in the exhibit, the 
exhibit one are amounts that only he has contributed. 
The Government matches that, so that when he ultimately 
retires, they put in an equal amount that he has 
contributed for the purposes of his retirement. Now 
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is she to get only one-fourth of his part of his 
contributions 
THE COURT: No, I don't care whether you call 
it matching by the Government or what, this is still 
income to him and they're still matching what he has 
already -- his income to him, whether they pay it 
direct to him or pay it in the form of retirement. 
MR. FLORENCE: Well, I don't want to belabor 
this, Judge, but I think it's important now that we 
have it clear on the record. If Mr. Woodward were 
capable of retiring today, the $17,503.00, assuming 
that that was the amount, would actually be matched by 
the Government of an equal amount. They would set up 
an annuity for him totaling that $35,000.00. 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
MR. FLORENCE: Now by your order then you are 
entitling her to one-fourth of that that he will 
receive, which includes the Government's participatory 
share? 
THE COURT: Yes. (T 71-75) 
It is clear from the Court's order that 
respondent is to receive one-fourth of appellant's 
retirement pay which will include a matched share by 
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the Government which is not yet vested in appellant. 
Presumably over the next fifteen years, appellant will 
continue to receive promotions and step increases in 
pay so that his ultimate retirement pay (the highest 
five years consecutive salary) will depend on his 
employment at a time when he is not even married to 
respondent. 
Appellant has no objections to an award to 
respondent of one-half of his presently vested 
retirement amount. That is the amount appellant would 
receive if he terminated his government service now, 
or $17,500.00. Therefore, respondent would have a 
right to $8,750.00. 
Under the Court's plan, however, assuming that 
appellant receives no further pay increases and 
accumulates an identical amount through his own 
contributions as have been accumulated in the last 
fifteen years, he would have $35,000.00 accumulated 
upon his retirement eligibility age. This is then 
matched by the Government so that appellant would have 
a minimum of $70.00.00 from which an annuity could be 
determined. Respondent would receive one-fourth of 
this or at least $17,500.00, the full amount of 
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appellant's presently vested benefits. 
This does not even take into account that 
appellant's actual annuity amount is most likely going 
to be determined by his work effort over the next 
fifteen years when he is not married to appellant, and 
yet she will share in those benefits. 
In Bennett v. Bennett, 607 P. 2d 839 (1980), 
this Court clearly held that it was error for the 
District Court to consider any portion of plaintiff's 
retirement fund contributed by the U.S. Government, 
which had no present value, in making a property 
division in a divorce. (At 840) 
It is submitted that Judge Christofferson, in 
making the award to respondent, has allowed her to 
share in an amount wnich has no present value and 
which will include contribution of the Government. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court erred in awarding respondent a 
portion of appellant's retirement benefits which are 
not yet vested or earned. 
DATED this 12th day of January, 1982. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FLORENCE AND HUTCHISON 
' '\ 
\ .. ·'' 
' ' .) '\ ~ ( (•~:') C" \..__,\./".,·"~~ \--~~~--.·~--- ~ 
BRIAN R. FLORENCE 
Attorney for Appellant 
818-26th Street 
Ogden, UT 84401 
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